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How is practical reasoning related to ethical reasoning? The most common view
is that they are identical: practical reasoning just is ethical reasoning. I criticize
this view and then propose an alternative account of the relation between ethical
thought and practical thought: ethical reasoning is reasoning about sound practical
reasoning. I argue that this account of the relation between ethics and practical rea-
soning explains various phenomena that more familiar views leave unexplained. It
also entails that the philosophy of action bears heavily on ethical inquiry.
We often think about what to do (or about how to act). When we do, we
are engaged in the kind of reasoning that—upon successful completion—
usually issues in an intention or action. I shall call this kind of reason-
ing practical reasoning. We also often think about what we ought to do (or
about what we have most reason to do). This sort of reasoning—when com-
pleted successfully—usually issues in a normative or ethical judgment.1
* I am grateful to Sarah Buss, Steve Darwall, Jamie Dreier, David Enoch, Allan
Gibbard, David Plunkett, Mark Schroeder, Nishi Shah, Daniel Star, Sharon Street, Sigrún
Svavarsdóttir, and David Velleman, as well as to two anonymous referees and various asso-
ciate editors at Ethics, for helpful discussions of the ideas in this article or comments on
earlier drafts. Earlier versions of the article were presented at Brandeis University and at
workshops at NYU Abu Dhabi and Dartmouth College. I received a great deal of helpful
feedback on each of these occasions. I also beneﬁted from the comments and papers of
the participants in a graduate seminar I taught at NYU in fall 2014. Finally, I am especially
indebted to Sarah Paul for reading and commenting on multiple drafts and for being such
a wise and encouraging interlocutor.
1. Throughout this article I use the terms “ethical” and “normative” interchangeably.
Like BernardWilliams, I understand ethics as a broad subject encompassingmore than ques-
tions of morality. For more on this distinction, see Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 4–11. My concern here, though, is with
the ethics of action—that is, with reasoning aboutwhat we ought (orhave reason) todo.Both
“ethical” and “normative” should therefore be taken tohave a narrower reference thanusual.
Questions about how we ought to feel are standardly counted as ethical questions, but they
fall outside the scope of this article. Similarly, questions about reasons for belief are stan-
dardly counted as normative questions; they too fall outside this article’s scope.
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I shall therefore call this sort of reasoning normative or ethical reason-
ing.2
How are these two kinds of reasoning related to one another? Per-
haps the most common view is that there are not actually two kinds of
reasoning here at all. For philosophers who subscribe to this view—
which I shall call the identity thesis—practical reasoning just is ethical rea-
soning; thinking about what to do just is thinking about what one ought
to do. Philosophers tend to arrive at the identity thesis from one of two
directions. Some start out thinking about the practical side of the equa-
tion. They wonder what makes practical reasoning practical. What must
practical reasoning be about—or how must its constituents function—
such that its successful completion usually yields an intention or action?
These philosophers answer this question by concluding that practical rea-
soning must be carried out under the guise of the good or, more broadly,
under the guise of the normative. Practical reasoning results in action be-
cause it is reasoning about what we ought to do or about what’s good,
and judgments about what we ought to do or about what’s good are—
or are at least supposed to be—motivating or action-guiding. Plato and
Aristotle are often regarded as the progenitors of this ﬁrst line of philos-
ophers, and their descendants include Aquinas, Kant, G. E. M. Anscombe,
Donald Davidson, Gary Watson, Warren Quinn, R. Jay Wallace, Joseph Raz,
and Sergio Tenenbaum.3
2. I have described each of these kinds of reasoning in two different ways: ﬁrst, in
terms of the question it seeks to answer and, second, in terms of its standard conclusion.
I treat these two descriptions as equivalent. Here I follow Pamela Hieronymi, who argues
that reasoning is essentially the attempt to settle a question and that all sorts of attitudes
can “embody their subject’s answer to some question” (“Two Kinds of Agency,” in Mental
Actions, ed. Lucy O’Brien and Matthew Soteriou [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009],
138). I do not believe anything important rests on this equivalence, though. The arguments
below could be cast entirely in terms of the relevant outputs—with practical reasoning un-
derstood solely as reasoning that normally concludes with an action or intention and nor-
mative reasoning understood solely as reasoning that normally concludes with a normative
judgment—without substantive loss.
3. Aristotle begins the Nicomachean Ethics thus: “Every sort of expert knowledge and
every inquiry, and similarly every action and undertaking, seems to seek some good” (Nico-
machean Ethics, trans. Christopher Rowe [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002], 1094a1–
1094a2). Here he may have been following Plato, who writes in the Republic that “every soul
pursues the good and does whatever it does for its sake” (Republic, trans. G. M. A. Grube and
rev. C. D. C. Reeve [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992], 505e). See also Thomas Aquinas, Summa
theologica (London: Blackfriars, 1964), I–II q.1 a.6; Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Rea-
son, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 58–59; G. E. M.
Anscombe, Intention, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 2000), 4–6; Donald
Davidson, “Actions, Reasons, and Causes,” in Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon,
1980), 3–20, 6; Gary Watson, “Free Agency,” Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975): 205–20, and
“Skepticism aboutWeakness ofWill,” Philosophical Review 86 (1977): 316–39;WarrenQuinn,
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Other philosophers arrive at the identity thesis by focusing initially
on the ethical side of the equation. In particular, they wonder whatmakes
ethical or normative judgments action-guiding. Why do judgments about
what we ought to do always (or almost always) ﬁgure prominently in de-
liberation about what to do? And why are such judgments always (or
almost always) accompanied by motivation—by a tendency to act in the
manner we judge favorably? These other philosophers answer such ques-
tions by concluding that ethical judgments must be essentially practical:
ethical judgments are action-guiding and are generally accompanied by
motivation because such judgments are themselves just conclusions of
practical reasoning. This second line of philosophers includes R.M.Hare
and latter-day expressivists Allan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn.4
Although these two sorts of theorists approach the relation between
practical and ethical reasoning fromdifferent theoretical starting points—
the former from the philosophy of action, the latter frommetaethics and
moral psychology—they arrive at the same conclusion: practical reason-
ing just is ethical reasoning. Of course, some of these philosophers think
that practical reasoning concludes with a judgment, whereas others think
that it concludes with an action.5 I take them all to be proponents of the
identity thesis because they all agree that practical reasoning “takes a dis-
tinctively normative question as its starting point,” and so they all take
there to be a single question that both practical reasoning and ethical rea-
soning seek to answer.6
Other philosophers reject the identity thesis and instead hold that
practical reasoning and ethical reasoning are largely independent of
“Putting Rationality in Its Place,” inMorality and Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1993), 228–55, 232–33; R. Jay Wallace, “Three Conceptions of Rational Agency,”
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (1999): 217–42; Joseph Raz, “On the Guise of the Good,”
in From Normativity to Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 59–84; and
Sergio Tenenbaum, Appearances of the Good (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007),
chap. 2. Raz’s paper includes an exemplary instance of the sort of inference I have in mind
here: “What agents believe about the action leads them to do it, and guides their doing of
it, all the way to its conclusion, and that suggests that they approve of the action, given what
they believe about it. They so act because they approve of the action, and that in turn means
that they think that it has some value, since value is what we approve of ” (“On the Guise of
the Good,” 116).
4. See R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: Clarendon, 1952), 171–72; Allan
Gibbard, Thinking How to Live (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 9; and Si-
mon Blackburn, Ruling Passions (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998), 1.
5. For the former view, see Donald Davidson, “How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?”
in Essays on Actions and Events, 21–42, 38–39; and Watson, “Skepticism about Weakness of
Will,” 327. For the latter view, see Aristotle,Movement of Animals, in A New Aristotle Reader, ed.
J. L. Ackrill (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 701a10–701a15; and
Anscombe, Intention, sec. 33.
6. R. Jay Wallace, “Practical Reason,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, summer 2014
ed., ed. Edward N. Zalta (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/practical-reason/), sec. 1.
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one another. According to these philosophers, determining what you
ought to do or what you have most reason to do is neither necessary nor
sufﬁcient for settling the question of what to do. Arriving at an answer
to the ethical or normative question leaves you still facing the practical
question, and the kind of reasoning you engage in to answer that latter
question may be utterly different from the kind of reasoning you engage
in to settle the former. Proponents of this way of thinking about the rela-
tion between practical and ethical reasoning include various so-called ex-
ternalists about normative judgment such as W. D. Ross, David Brink,
Derek Parﬁt, Russ Shafer-Landau, and T. M. Scanlon.7 For these philoso-
phers, the only connection between ethical thought and practical thought
is a normative one. Rationality requires you to do (or to intend to do) what
you judge you ought to do, and so insofar as you are rational, your prac-
tical reasoning will be in line with your ethical reasoning. If you are irra-
tional, though, your practical deliberationsmay very well ignore your eth-
ical convictions.8
The view I defend in this article lies somewhere between these two
familiar approaches. I agree with the externalists that there are two gen-
uinely different kinds of reasoning here: thinking about what to do does
not require one to think about what one ought to, and one may arrive at
7. See W. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon, 1939), 206; David Brink,
Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989),
45–50; Derek Parﬁt, On What Matters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 2:386–87;
Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), chap. 6; and
T. M. Scanlon, Being Realistic about Reasons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), lecture 3.
The internalism/externalism distinction I have in mind here concerns the motivational or
practical upshot of normative judgments. According to normative judgment internalists, such
judgments necessarily involve some degree of motivation; according to normative judgment
externalists, there is only a contingent connection between these judgments and motivation.
There are various complications, of course, some of which are discussed brieﬂy below. (See
n. 26 below in particular.) In the meantime, these versions of internalism and externalism
should be distinguished from others, most notably the views often called existence internal-
ism and existence externalism (or internalism and externalism about reasons). These views
address the connection between motivation and the existence of reasons for action, whereas
I am concerned here with the connection between motivation and judgments about reasons
for action. For this way of labeling these two pairs of views, see Stephen Darwall, Impartial Rea-
son (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 54.
8. Strictly speaking, an externalist could accept the identity thesis. Externalism is a
view about the connection between normative judgment andmotivation, and one’s norma-
tive judgment might fail to produce motivation even if that judgment is also the conclusion
of one’s practical deliberation. This seems to be H. A. Prichard’s view in “Duty and Inter-
est,” inMoral Writings (Oxford: Clarendon, 2002), 21–49, 38–39. It is certainly Nishi Shah’s
view in “How Action Governs Intention,” Philosophers Imprint 8 (2008): 1–19. I do not inter-
pret Brink, Parﬁt, Shafer-Landau, and Scanlon as holding this view, since they all insist on
the irrationality of acting contrary to one’s normative judgment. As I argue in the ﬁnal two
paragraphs of Section I below, Shah’s externalist version of the identity thesis cannot make
sense of this charge of irrationality.
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a conclusion about what one ought to do without settling the matter of
what to do. Consequently, I believe that we can understand practical rea-
soning in nonnormative terms: practical reasoning is performed not un-
der the guise of the normative, but rather under someother guise. Unlike
the externalists, however, I take the relation between ethical and practical
reasoning to be more than merely normative. In particular, I believe that
normative thought can be analyzed in terms of practical thought: norma-
tive reasoning is reasoning about practical reasoning—either one’s own
or someone else’s. This view of the relation between ethics and practical
reasoning accounts for various phenomena that its more extreme coun-
terparts leave unexplained, including both the possibility of clear-eyed
akrasia and its philosophical signiﬁcance. It also entails that practical rea-
soning is conceptually prior to ethical or normative reasoning, and thus
that the philosophy of action bears heavily on ethical inquiry.
I
Why should we think that practical reasoning is conceptually prior to nor-
mative or ethical reasoning? Why, for that matter, should we think that
there are even two distinct kinds of reasoning here? After all, the prevail-
ing philosophical view seems to be that they are one and the same.
Perhaps the most familiar argument for the distinction between
ethical thought and practical thought appeals to the possibility of akrasia
or weakness of will. As David Wiggins observes, “Almost anyone not un-
der the inﬂuence of theory will say that, when a person is weak-willed,
he intentionally chooses that which he knows or believes to be the worse
course of action when he could choose the better course; and that, in
acting in this way, the weak-willed man acts not for no reason at all—that
would be strange and atypical—but irrationally.”9 Cases of weakness of
will are cases in which practical thought diverges from ethical or norma-
tive thought. That’s how they’re ordinarily described, at any rate. As Wig-
gins suggests, philosophers in thrall to theory frequently reject these
ordinary descriptions and instead ﬁnd ways to reinterpret the cases so
that the relevant agents turn out not to be acting contrary to their better
judgments. For this reason, appealing to cases of apparent akrasia has
proved to advance the debate about the relation between ethical thought
and practical thought very little.
Fortunately, there are simpler cases that promise to advance the de-
bate much further. Consider my current situation. I ﬁrmly believe that I
ought to have lunch at home tomorrow. Actually, I know it. When I dine
out, I tend to overeat. Plus, money is rather tight at the moment, and
9. David Wiggins, “Weakness of Will, Commensurability, and the Objects of Deliber-
ation and Desire,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 79 (1979): 251–77, 251.
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even a casual lunch out will cost notably more than a quick meal at home.
Besides, I have all the ﬁxings for one of my favorite sandwiches in the re-
frigerator, and so it is not as though I will suffer if I eat at home. Of course
I know that there are also reasons to go out, but those reasons are not dis-
positive—not even close. It is quite clear, then—obvious, even—that I
ought to have lunch at home tomorrow. I have ﬁrmly resolved the nor-
mative question; further reﬂection on the matter seems pointless. I have
not, however, decided where to have lunch tomorrow. Frankly, I have not
even thought about it. I have not made any plans, nor do I even have any
expectations as to where I will eat. I have, in short, no intention one way
or the other. I suppose I could decide now, but what would be the point
of that? Practical deliberation about where to have lunch tomorrow can
wait until tomorrow.
As I have described my current situation, normative or ethical delib-
eration has concluded even though practical deliberation has yet to be-
gin. This description strikes me as obviously correct. In having ﬁrmly set-
tled what I ought to do, I have not settled or even taken up the question
of what to do. When I do eventually take up that question, my view about
what I have most reason to do may very well ﬁgure in my reasoning. But
it might not. Of course, as I deliberate about where to eat I will weigh
various considerations against one another, and in so doing I will be tak-
ing stock of my reasons for action. But I can deliberate about my reasons
without thinking of them in those terms. I can weigh the relevant consid-
erations against one another and come to a decision about what to do
without deploying any normative concepts, just as I can weigh evidence
and come to a conclusion about what to believe without thinking of my
evidence as reasons or about my conclusion as what I ought to believe.10
When I arrive at a belief on the basis of theoretical reasoning, I believe
for reasons even if I do not think of my evidence in normative terms. Sim-
ilarly, when I decide where to have lunch on the basis of some consider-
ation, I act for a reason even if I do not entertain a normative thought. So,
although practical reasoningmay necessarily involve the weighing of rea-
sons, it does not necessarily involve doing so under that description.11
That is why tomorrow I can take up the practical question of where to
10. I can reason my way to a belief without deploying normative concepts because the-
oretical reasoning is governed by a substantive, nonnormative aim: truth. All I need to do
in order to believe on the basis of reasons is believe on the basis of my evidence. If—as I
argue below in Section IV—practical reasoning is also governed by a substantive, nonnor-
mative aim, then I should also be able to reason my way to an intention or action without
deploying normative concepts.
11. For more on how agents can act for reasons—and respond to those reasons as rea-
sons—without doing so under that description, see J. David Velleman, “Introduction,” in
The Possibility of Practical Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 14–20 (especially
n. 20) and 28, n. 34.
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have lunch without thereby also taking up the normative question of
where I ought to have lunch, and why as of now I have settled the nor-
mative question without even considering the practical one.
Philosophers under the inﬂuence of the relevant theory will insist
that my current situation could not possibly be as I have described it. But
is my situation really so remarkable? Consider your own. Choose any mat-
ter where you have ﬁrmly made up your mind as to what you ought to
do. It might be something you ought to do tomorrow, or something you
ought to do next year. Choose something obvious—a case where reopen-
ing deliberation about what you ought to do seems utterly pointless—
where, upon a moment’s reﬂection, you think to yourself, “Of course
that’s what I ought to do!” Have you decided to do it? Perhaps in some
cases you have. I suspect that in others you have not. I suspect that in some
cases you have settled the normative question without even entertaining
the practical one.With respect to those cases, you know what you ought to
do, but you have not even thought about what to do.
One way to resist the force of such observations is to claim that nor-
mative reasoning has merely been suspended, not concluded. Come to-
morrow, I will decide where to have lunch by reopening the question of
where I ought to have lunch. My practical deliberation will therefore
turn out just to be further normative deliberation. And once I have re-
opened the question of what I ought to do, who knows how I will answer
it? Who knows how different my normative outlook will be tomorrow
morning as lunchtime nears? Perhaps the allure of my favorite local res-
taurant will be so great that I will revise my assessment of the relevant rea-
sons and decide that the considerations which seem clearly dispositive
now are actually outweighed by other considerations. This, of course,
is how Plato describes such situations in the Protagoras. According to Plato,
my normative conclusions tonight fail to settle the matter of what I am go-
ing to do not because there is more to practical reasoning than normative
reasoning, but rather because I lack the “art ofmeasurement.”12 Under the
illusion that things which are nearer are bigger or more signiﬁcant, I afford
proximate costs and beneﬁts undue weight in my normative calculations.
So, as lunchtime approaches, my normative outlook will change and fur-
ther normative deliberation will be necessary.
As a description of what will happen tomorrow when I decide where
to eat, this strikes me as thoroughly implausible. Nothing about its being
closer to lunchtime is going to make the considerations that ﬁgured in
this evening’s normative deliberations any less dispositive. Remember,
it’s not a close call: I have no doubt that I ought to eat at home tomor-
row. My normative outlook may shift somewhat, but it will not turn itself
12. Plato, Protagoras, trans. Stanley Lombardo and Karen Bell (Indianapolis: Hackett,
1992), 356d.
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upside down.13 When tomorrow comes I will deliberate about where to
have lunch, knowing all the while where I ought to have lunch.
Another way to resist this conclusion would be to maintain that al-
though I have arrived at an all-things-considered normative judgment, I
have yet to form an all-out or unconditional normative judgment, and
so there is still some normative reasoning left to undertake. This is how
Donald Davidson would describe my situation. According to Davidson,
all-things-considered judgments—judgments of the form, “Given all of
the relevant considerations known to me, I ought to J”—are only a step
along the way toward the conclusion of practical reasoning. Practical rea-
soning concludes and I form an intention only when I detach the nor-
mative conclusion from the conditions and judge all out, “I ought to J.”14
Perhaps, then, I have yet to take this ﬁnal step of normative reasoning,
which explains why I have not yet decided where to have lunch tomorrow.
This also strikes me as an obviously inaccurate description of my
current situation. As far as I can tell, I have taken my normative deliber-
ations as far as they can go. Although I may have paused along the way at
an all-things-considered judgment, I did not stop there. The conclusion
I have drawn—what I know right now—is that tomorrow I ought to eat
lunch at home. Davidson will insist that I have therefore decided what
to do and formed the relevant intention, but nothing about my situation
supports that further conclusion. The intention to perform some action
is usually accompanied by the disposition to assert that one is going to
perform that action, perhaps because it is also usually accompanied by
the belief that one is going to perform it. Yet I am not at all disposed
to assert that I am going to have lunch at home tomorrow, nor do I be-
lieve it to be the case. I don’t know where I am going to eat tomorrow,
even though I do know where I ought to eat. I have answered the norma-
tive question without arriving at an intention.
Some proponents of the identity thesis might be willing to accept
this description of my situation. Nishi Shah, for instance, acknowledges
that sometimes our intentions do not comport with our judgments
about what we ought to do: I may decide to eat lunch at a restaurant even
though I know that I ought to eat at home. Yet Shah also maintains that
practical deliberation proceeds by settling the question of what we ought
13. We can make this even clearer by adding moral considerations to the mix. Sup-
pose that I have promised my wife—sworn a solemn oath on the grave of my beloved grand-
mother—not to go out for lunch this week, and that I therefore regard myself as under a
binding obligation to eat at home. Only some conﬂicting obligation could make me even
consider the possibility that I ought to go out for lunch tomorrow. Now it seems even more
implausible that tomorrow’s practical deliberations about where to dine will involve my re-
opening the normative question. The relative proximity of lunchtime will not lead me to
revise my views about the overriding and categorical nature of moral obligations.
14. See Davidson, “How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?” 31–42.
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to do: “the answer to the deliberative question [whether to A] is a norma-
tive judgment.”15 According to Shah, then, although there is a gap be-
tween normative judgments and intentions (or actions), the transition
from the former to the latter does not involve any further reasoning.
Once we have settled the question of what we ought to do, practical de-
liberation has concluded.
The problem with this version of the identity thesis is that it makes
it difﬁcult to see how one’s intentions or actions could ever be proper
objects of rational assessment. If, as Shah claims, no “further reasoning
is required to mediate the transition from judging that we ought to A to
intending to A,” then the failure to make that transition cannot be a fail-
ure of rationality.16 Put another way, if there is no rational or deliberative
process leading from normative judgments to intentions, then it makes
no sense to criticize me as irrational for intending to eat out even though
I believe that I ought to eat at home. And more generally, if we cannot
reason our way to an intention or action, then our intentions and actions
cannot be rational or irrational. As Shah describes it, the process of de-
ciding whether to act on the basis of one’s normative judgment is just a
brute causal one: we arrive at an intention just by waiting to see whether
our normative commitments will have their usual practical or motiva-
tional force. This description does justice neither to the phenomenology
of practical deliberation nor to our sense that our intentions and actions
can be more or less rational.17 Even when I already know what I ought to
do, the process of deciding what to do is a deliberative one; even when
I have answered the question of what I ought to do, I must still consider
the question of what to do.
II
Why do so many philosophers think otherwise? Some of the most famil-
iar arguments against the distinction between normative and practical
thought rest on an impoverished representation of the theoretical alter-
15. Shah, “How Action Governs Intention,” 3. Shah actually characterizes the ques-
tion we pose in practical deliberation as the question whether to intend to A, rather than
as the question whether to A. For my purposes here, this difference is unimportant.
16. Ibid., 11.
17. In “Skepticism about Practical Reason,” Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986): 5–25,
Christine Korsgaard suggests that intuitionists like Prichard do not actually believe in prac-
tical reason (10). I take her worry to be related to the one I am expressing here about
Shah’s view. If the move from normative judgment to intention or action does not involve
reasoning or deliberation, then there really is no such thing as genuinely practical reason-
ing, or reasoning that issues in intentions or actions. Shah claims that our normative judg-
ments might still normally cause or be followed by intentions (“How Action Governs Inten-
tion,” 11), but these intentions will be by-products of deliberation, not conclusions of
practical reasoning.
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natives. Allan Gibbard, for example, starts with the platitude that “ethics
concerns what to do.”18 He then argues that we can do justice to this plat-
itude only by recognizing that “ought questions and reason questions are
by their very nature questions of what to do”: “thinking what I ought to do
amounts to deciding what to do.”19 The alternative—insisting that these
questions are different—is tantamount to “driving what to do out of eth-
ics.”20 It leaves ethical thought inert and therefore otiose. Here Gibbard
is echoing his prescriptivist predecessor R. M. Hare. In The Language of
Morals, Hare begins with a similarly uncontroversial thought: “the func-
tion of [ethical judgments] is to guide conduct.”21 The only way for them
to do this, according to Hare, is by directly answering the practical ques-
tion of what to do.22 So, if we deny that ethical judgments are practical
thoughts of some sort—thoughts about what to do—we must deny that
ethical thought is essentially practical or acting-guiding.
Hare and Gibbard both assume that the only alternative to the iden-
tiﬁcation of ethical reasoning with practical reasoning is a starkly exter-
nalist view according to which the former has nothing to do with the lat-
ter. On such a view, ethical conclusions will be stops along the way to
practical conclusions only if agents happen to be motivated to do what
they ought to do. Ethics becomes only contingently practical, just like any
other subject. This rather extreme brand of externalism has had various
distinguished adherents over the years.23 Derek Parﬁt defends a position
along these lines in On What Matters. According to Parﬁt, “when we con-
clude that we ought to do something, we are not deciding to do this thing,
but coming to have a normative belief.” Although our decisions are com-
monly based on such beliefs, “these decisions are not the same as our com-
ing to have these beliefs.”24 In any particular instance of deliberation about
what to do, then, there is no guarantee that one’s normative judgments
will play a practical or guiding role.
Both Hare and Gibbard overstate the commitments of externalists
like Parﬁt. They insist that externalists must allow for the possibility of
agents whose normative judgments are entirely inert. Such agents might
never act in accordance with their judgments about how they ought to
act.25 The problem with this characterization of externalism is that, as
18. Gibbard, Thinking How to Live, 13.
19. Ibid., 9, 17.
20. Ibid., 13.
21. Hare, The Language of Morals, 1.
22. Ibid., 29, 171–72.
23. For the term “extreme externalism,” see Michael Bratman, “Practical Reasoning
and Weakness of the Will,” Noûs 13 (1979): 153–71, 159.
24. Parﬁt, On What Matters, 2:386.
25. See R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963), 68–69; and Gibbard,
Thinking How to Live, 12—in particular the discussion of Tweedledum and Tweedledee. Com-
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Gibbard acknowledges, externalists usually insist on a normative con-
nection between ethical reasoning and practical reasoning: rationality
requires agents to do what they judge they ought to do.26 And so exter-
nalism would allow for agents who never act in accordance with their
normative judgments only if it could allow for agents who are thoroughly
or systematically irrational. Yet there are independent reasons to think
that agents can be only locally irrational. Were we ever presented with
agents who appeared to display a complete disconnect between their nor-
mative judgments and their practical conclusions, something akin toDon-
ald Davidson’s principle of charity would require us to interpret those
apparently normative conclusions as judgments of some other sort.27 The
rational connection between one’s normative conclusions and one’s prac-
tical conclusions therefore ensures that any discrepancies between them
will bemerely local. In other words, once we accept the rational connection
between ethical reasoning and practical reasoning, there are limits to just
how far the two can come apart.
This rational connection also provides externalists with the re-
sources they need to explain the logical link between ethical judgments
and action identiﬁed by Hare. Even when those judgments fail to moti-
vate us, they remain connected to our actions by the norms of rationality.
Regardless of whether our ethical judgments inﬂuence our behavior,
then, they guide our conduct by bearing on its rationality. And thus even
for extreme externalists like Parﬁt, there is a clear sense in which ethical
judgments are concerned with what to do.
I nevertheless agree with Gibbard and Hare that this sort of exter-
nalism is implausible. As I shall argue in Section III, the connection be-
tween ethical reasoning and practical reasoning is tighter than Parﬁt and
other externalists suppose. Yet neither Gibbard nor Hare gives us any
reason to think that extreme externalism is the only alternative to their
rather extreme internalism. We can deny that ethical reasoning is identi-
cal to practical reasoning without claiming that one is only contingently
(or normatively) related to the other. If there are other ways for ethics to
pare Bratman, “Practical Reasoning and Weakness of the Will,” 158–59; and Sarah Stroud,
“Weakness of the Will,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, spring 2014 ed., ed. Edward N. Zalta
(http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014 /entries/weakness-will/), sec. 1.
26. See, for instance, Derek Parﬁt, “Reasons and Motivation,” Proceedings of the Aristo-
telian Society, suppl. vol., 71 (1997): 99–130, 130. The view that agents will act (or intend) in
accordance with their normative judgments insofar as those agents are rational is often cate-
gorized as a weak version of internalism rather than a form of externalism. See Michael
Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 60–62; and Ralph Wedgwood, The Na-
ture of Normativity (Oxford: Clarendon, 2007), 23–28.
27. Here I am appealing to the sort of holism Davidson defends in “Mental Events”
and “Psychology as Philosophy,” both in Essays on Actions and Events. I am indebted to Nishi
Shah for pointing out the relevance of Davidsonian holism.
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be concerned with what to do—or for ethical deliberation to be action-
guiding—we can capture the essential practicality of ethics without col-
lapsing the distinction between ethical thought and practical thought.
At most, then, Gibbard and Hare have challenged us to articulate an al-
ternative account of the relation between ethical thought and practical
thought, one that sits somewhere between their extreme internalism
and Parﬁt’s extreme externalism. I shall take up this challenge below. For
now, the important point is simply that Gibbard and Hare have not given
us any reason to think that it cannot be met.
A second argument for the identiﬁcation of ethical reasoning with
practical reasoning starts from the uncontroversial premise that practi-
cal reasoning is practical not only in its subject matter, but also in its is-
sue.28 It gets us going, even if it does not guarantee that we will act. In
short, practical reasoning produces motivation. How could it do this if
it concluded in anything other than a normative judgment? After all, prac-
tical deliberation has to conclude in something like a judgment, otherwise
it is not clear how it could be a form of reasoning. And whereas normative
judgments are commonly taken to be intrinsically motivating, other sorts
of judgments are at most only contingently motivating. And so it seems
that the only way tomake sense of the fact that practical deliberation gives
rise to action is to suppose that it is essentially normative deliberation.
This argument purports to show that we can explain themotivational
upshot of practical reasoning only by assuming that practical reasoning is
tantamount to normative or ethical reasoning. Yet philosophers of action
have provided a number of plausible alternative explanations. Michael
Bratman, for instance, has developed a theory of planning agency accord-
ing to which practical reasoning concludes not in a judgment but in an
intention, where that is a distinctive practical attitude—an attitude with
its own motivational force.29 J. David Velleman, meanwhile, has argued
that we engage in practical reasoning in order to make sense of ourselves.
According to Velleman, intentions are beliefs about what one is going to
do (and why one is going to do it). These beliefs motivate action by engag-
ing a desire or drive to understand oneself and thus to act in ways one will
ﬁnd intelligible. The beliefs are necessarily motivating because the drive in
question is constitutive of agency.30 Not only do these alternative accounts
fully explain themotivational upshot of practical reasoning, they also pro-
vide powerful explanations of various other puzzling features of agency
and practical thought—features that the normative conception of practi-
28. Compare Darwall, Impartial Reason, 51.
29. See Michael Bratman, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason (Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press, 1987).
30. See J. David Velleman, Practical Reﬂection (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1989).
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cal reasoning leaves utterly mysterious.31 It should be clear, then, that we
can explain how reasoning can be practical in its issue without supposing
that it is reasoning about what one ought to do.
A third argument against the distinction between practical thought
and normative thought appeals to the difference between compulsion
and autonomy or self-control. According to Gary Watson, if practical rea-
soning were distinct from ethical reasoning, we would not be able to dis-
tinguish cases where one’s strongest desire overpowers one’s will from
cases where one’s strongest desire just is (or at least determines) one’s
will. For when agents are moved by motives that are independent of their
values, “their motivation is [always] ‘alien’ to them . . . they seem moti-
vated contrary to their own wills.”32 Therefore, Watson concludes, prac-
tical thought that is untethered from ethical thought can never issue in
free or autonomous action. Sarah Buss argues against the distinction be-
tween practical and normative thought on similar grounds. According to
Buss, “practical deliberators cannot set their own goals without holding
evaluative beliefs about the goals their desires incline them to pursue,”
and so an action cannot be “self-directed” unless “the agent is motivated
by the belief that there is something in favor of performing it.”33
Watson and Buss both assume that the only alternative to their nor-
mative conception of practical reasoning is a streamlined Humean view
according to which practical reasoning is solely concerned with the sat-
isfaction of our ultimate ends or desires. On this sort of view, we exercise
our agency whenever our behavior is jointly caused by a desire for some
outcome and a belief about how to effect or promote that outcome.34
The driving force behind agency and practical reasoning is thus always
some motive or desire. Yet our notion of autonomy requires that it be
the agent—and notmerely somemotive within her—that undertakes prac-
tical deliberation and is thereby the force behind the ensuing action. The
problem with the Humean view is that it leaves no work for the agent
herself to do. Appealing to higher-order motives will not help, since—
as Buss observes—“there is no reason to think that a desire reﬂects the
point of view of the agent herself just because it is of an especially high
31. For an extended argument to this effect, see Kieran Setiya, Reasons without Ratio-
nalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), pt. 1.
32. Watson, “Skepticism about Weakness of Will,” 326–27. Compare Tenenbaum, Ap-
pearances of the Good, 263–68.
33. Sarah Buss, “What Practical Reasoning Must Be If We Act for Our Own Reasons,”
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (1999): 399–421, 403, 401.
34. At least since Davidson, defenders of the Humean view have recognized that the
behavior produced by desires and beliefs can rise to the level of autonomous action only if
it is caused “in the right way.” Donald Davidson, “Freedom to Act,” in Essays on Actions and
Events, 79. Causation in the wrong way—often called deviant or wayward causation—must
be ruled out.
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order.”35 The only way to get the agent into the picture is “to get her ap-
plication of norms into the picture.”36
Various philosophers sympathetic to the Humean account of agency
and practical reasoning have attempted to deﬂect this charge. Even if these
attempts fail, though—even if this objection is fatal to the Humean view—
we need not retreat to the view that practical reasoning is identical to nor-
mative reasoning. There are other alternatives available. Consider again
Velleman’s account of agency. Velleman also rejects the standard,Humean
story of action, in part because he too thinks that the agent herself is miss-
ing from that story. Velleman’s solution to this problem is to appeal not
to a higher-order motive, but rather to a motive “that drives practical
thought itself”—a motive or drive that necessarily stands behind the lens
of critical examination, even when it also is the object of such examina-
tion.37 This motive operates behind the scenes, adjudicating among var-
ious other motives. It is therefore functionally equivalent to the agent
herself. When this motive determines what she does, she determines what
she does. Or so Velleman argues, at any rate. Bratman tells a different story
about autonomy and self-control. Agents exercise control over their be-
havior when that behavior is driven by what Bratman calls “self-governing
policies.” Self-governing policies are a particular species of intention: they
are general policies or plans about how to weigh various kinds of con-
siderations in practical reasoning. For Bratman, then, it is these general
intentions that play the functional role of the agent when we act autono-
mously.38
I cannot defend either of these accounts of autonomy here—al-
though I think each is more compelling than the view that we exercise
our agency only by acting in accordance with our normative judgments.
The important point is just that—like the other arguments discussed in
this section—Watson’s and Buss’s arguments rest on a false dichotomy.
Were our only choices with respect to theories of practical reasoning
the standard, Humean view on the one hand and the view that practical
reasoning is essentially normative on the other, the latter would probably
be the best option. Similarly, were our only choices with respect to theo-
ries of normative reasoning Parﬁt’s extreme externalism and Hare and
Gibbard’s extreme internalism, I would be inclined to opt for the latter.
Fortunately, our theoretical options are not so limited.
35. Buss, “What Practical Reasoning Must Be,” 411 n. 24.
36. Ibid.
37. J. David Velleman, “What Happens When Someone Acts,” Mind 101 (1992): 461–
81, 477.
38. Michael Bratman, “Autonomy and Hierarchy,” Social Philosophy and Policy 20
(2003): 156–76, especially sec. 5.
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III
If the foregoing is correct, there is little reason to accept the identity the-
sis. Practical thought is distinct from ethical thought, and the former need
not be cast in terms of the latter. Practical reasoning does not aim at iden-
tifying what one ought to do or what one has most reason to do, at least
under those guises. Yet it must aim at something; theremust be something
that counts as success in practical reasoning.
One account of this aim is uncontroversial: practical reasoning aims
atﬁguringoutwhat todo.This characterization, thoughaccurate, is incom-
plete. It speciﬁes only the formal object of practical reasoning, and—as
Velleman has argued—“any enterprise that has a formal object must have
a substantive object as well—that is, a goal that is not stated solely in terms
that depend on the concept of being the object of that enterprise.”39
In the case of a competitive game, there must be a substantive ob-
ject of the game, something that constitutes winning but cannot
simply consist in winning, so described. A game whose object was
speciﬁable only as “winning” wouldn’t have an object—that is,
wouldn’t have any object in particular. And if a game had no partic-
ular object, then there would be no such thing as winning it, and
so it wouldn’t be a fully constituted competitive game. Similarly, a
hunt whose object was speciﬁable only as “the quarry” wouldn’t be
a fully constituted search, and the question “What is the answer?”
isn’t by itself a fully constituted question.40
Practical reasoning as well, then, must have a substantive object or aim:
there must be something at which practical reasoning aims in virtue of
which it aims at ﬁguring out what to do.
Let me elaborate by returning to the example involving tomorrow’s
lunch. Suppose that the time for practical deliberation has come: I must
now decide whether to eat at home or go out for lunch. In order to rea-
son my way to a decision or intention, there must be some criterion or
standard that guides my deliberation. There must be some object or
aim I am attempting to achieve in deciding one way or the other. Could
my aim be simply to identify “the thing to do”?41 Velleman’s point is that
although I am indeed looking for the “the thing to do,” I cannot look for
it solely under that description, just as I cannot conduct a search for
something that is described solely as “the thing I am looking for.” There
must be a mark in virtue of which something counts as the thing for
39. Velleman, “The Possibility of Practical Reason,” 700–701.
40. Ibid., 701. Compare Wedgwood, The Nature of Normativity, 51–53.
41. This is how Allan Gibbard describes the aim of practical reasoning. See Gibbard,
Thinking How to Live, 7.
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which I am searching if my activity is to constitute a genuine search. Sim-
ilarly, there must be some mark in virtue of which a course of action
counts as “the thing to do,” and practical reasoningmust involve the search
for that mark. Without such a mark, I would have no basis on which to de-
termine whether eating at home or going out for lunch is the thing to do.
Thus, just as theoretical reasoning is driven by the substantive aim of
truth, so must practical reasoning be driven by some substantive aim of
its own.
Moreover, if—as I argued above—the identity thesis is false, then
the aim of practical reasoning cannot be to identify what one ought to
do, at least under that description. For if that were the aim, then answer-
ing the normative question would never fail to answer the practical ques-
tion. Practical reasoning must therefore be driven by an aim we can un-
derstand in nonnormative or descriptive terms.42
But how, then, should we understand the relation between norma-
tive thought and practical thought? More speciﬁcally, what is the point
of normative or ethical thought? What are our normative concepts for?
If practical reasoning does not aim at what we have most reason to do
(at least under that description), and thus does not require the deploy-
ment of normative concepts, why do we nevertheless so often conduct
our practical deliberations in normative terms? Why do our normative
judgments ﬁgure so frequently in our practical deliberations?
These questions are especially pressing for externalists like Parﬁt.
If ethical thought is only contingently practical or motivating, why do
our ethical judgments so reliably ﬁgure in our practical deliberations?
Why, in other words, do we happen to care so much about doing what
we ought to do? One familiar externalist explanation is provided by W. D.
Ross: “When I ask myself why I do my duty (when I do it, and do it consci-
entiously), the truest answer I can ﬁnd is that I do it because, then at least, I
desire to domy dutymore than I desire anything else.”43 Ross is concerned
42. Considerations of space preclude my offering an account of the substantive aim of
practical reasoning here. For a crude example of what such an account might look like, see
Jeremy Bentham’s psychological hedonism: “Nature has placed mankind under the gover-
nance of two sovereign masters, pain, and pleasure. It is for them alone . . . to determine
what we shall do” (An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed. J. H. Burns
andH. L. A. Hart [Oxford: Clarendon, 1996], 11). Somewhat more plausible is the familiar
instrumentalist conception of practical reasoning associated with the Hobbesian and
Humean traditions. According to instrumentalists, the point of practical reasoning is to
help us achieve our ultimate goals or satisfy our intrinsic desires. See, for instance, David
Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), chap. 2. For a rather more com-
plex and compelling account of the substantive aim of practical reasoning, see Velleman,
Practical Reﬂection.
43. Ross, Foundations of Ethics, 206. Compare Prichard, “Duty and Interest,” 38; and
Parﬁt, On What Matters, 2:416.
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speciﬁcally with moral judgments here, but this sort of explanation is even
more plausible when applied to normative judgments more generally:
the reason why our normative judgments play such a signiﬁcant role in
our practical lives is that we all want to do what we ought (or have most
reason) to do. Unfortunately, this explanation merely pushes the relevant
questions back a step: we have not genuinely explained the practical sig-
niﬁcance of normative judgments if we have not explained why human
beings tend to desire to do what they ought to do. Put another way, the
ubiquitous desire to act as we ought is just a manifestation of the phe-
nomenon that needs to be explained, and so it cannot explain that phe-
nomenon.44
Other accounts of the practical signiﬁcance of our ethical commit-
ments are similarly inadequate. According to Russ Shafer-Landau, for in-
stance, “the near-perfect alignment of [normative] judgment and (some
degree of) motivation can be explained by the intrinsic, prima facie mo-
tivational power of [normative] judgment.”45 Like Ross, though, Shafer-
Landau solves one explanatory puzzle only by creating another. We have
not genuinely explained the practical signiﬁcance of normative judgments
if we have not explained why normative judgments are intrinsically moti-
vating. This further puzzle is precisely what pushes philosophers like Hare
and Gibbard in the direction of the identity thesis. For if the identity the-
sis were true, there would be no puzzle here: normative judgments would
be intrinsically motivating because they would be conclusions of practi-
cal reasoning—they would be answers to the practical question of what
to do. If, however, the identity thesis is false, then the intrinsic motivational
power of normative judgments cries out for explanation, especially given
that most other kinds of judgment lack this distinctive power.
Shafer-Landau suggests that the task of providing the relevant expla-
nation should fall to evolutionary biologists and social scientists rather
than philosophers.46 Yet it is difﬁcult to see how any evolutionary or so-
ciological explanation could be forthcoming, at least if we take seriously
Shafer-Landau’s view that normative judgments are beliefs about irre-
ducibly normative nonnatural properties—properties that fall outside
the purview of the natural and social sciences.47 Presumably any scientiﬁc
account of normative beliefs could explain their distinctive practical sig-
44. David Enoch proposes a number of explanations along these lines in Taking Mo-
rality Seriously (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 252–55, and each exhibits the same
failing: it leaves the larger phenomenon—the practical signiﬁcance of our normative judg-
ments—mysterious.
45. Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism, 157. Michael Smith offers a similar explanation of
the practical signiﬁcance of moral judgments (The Moral Problem, 71–76).
46. Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism, 160.
47. Ibid., 17, 59–60.
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niﬁcance only by citing the natural or social phenomena those beliefs are
about. But if, as Shafer-Landau and other nonnaturalists suppose, nor-
mative judgments are not actually about such phenomena, then there
is no material out of which scientists and social scientists could construct
the needed explanations. Nonnaturalism thus appears to rule out the
possibility of any a posteriori explanation of the practical signiﬁcance
of ethical thought.48
T. M. Scanlon attempts to deﬂect the demand for further explana-
tion by claiming that the practical signiﬁcance of normative judgments
is conceptually guaranteed and therefore stands in no need of explana-
tion. Scanlon frames his argument in terms of a “conception” of rational
agency: “[The] familiar idea of rational agency explains the practical sig-
niﬁcance of [judgments] about reasons. If a rational agent judges p to be
a reason to do a under certain circumstances, then he or she will normally
treat p as weighing in favor of a on appropriate occasions. If he or she
judges that p is conclusive reason to do a, then he or she will normally
so act when the occasion arises.”49 For Scanlon, the practical signiﬁcance
of normative judgments is built into our understanding of rational agency.
Why do our ethical commitments ﬁgure so prominently in our practical
lives? Because we are rational, and it is part of the very idea of rationality
that rational agents accord practical weight to their ethical commitments.
Unfortunately, this is not the appropriate sort of explanation. The
conceptual truth that normative judgments are intrinsically motivating
or that rational agents tend to act in accordance with their normative
judgments cannot explain the metaphysical or psychological fact that
our normative judgments regularly have practical consequences. Concep-
tual truths cannot provide metaphysical or psychological explanations,
and those are the kinds of explanations we are after here. Let me elabo-
rate with an example. Suppose we are considering a theory of the nature
of water that cannot explain why water is clear. And suppose I object that
this explanatory failing is a strike against the theory: all other things being
equal, we should opt for a theory that explains the clarity of water. It would
be no response to my objection to say that water’s clarity is conceptually
guaranteed and therefore stands in no need of explanation. That is, it
would be no response to point out that water is clear by deﬁnition. This
is the wrong sort of explanation. Reminding us that our concept of water
48. Nonreductive naturalists might have more to say here. See, for instance, Brink,
Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, 78–79. Expressivists deﬁnitely have more to
say here. See Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1990), chap. 4. Unfortunately, Gibbard’s explanations—and expressivist explana-
tions more generally—presuppose the truth of the identity thesis. Reductionists also have
more to say here. See Section IV below.
49. Scanlon, Being Realistic about Reasons, 55.
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applies to the stuff in Lake Michigan partly in virtue of the fact that that
stuff is clear does not explain why the stuff in Lake Michigan is clear. It
may provide a partial explanation of why our concept of water applies
to the stuff in Lake Michigan. It may also explain why the stuff in Lake
Michigan would not be water were it not clear. It does not explain, how-
ever, why the stuff in Lake Michigan is clear, and that is what a theory of
water should explain.
Return now to the practical signiﬁcance of our ethical commitments.
Scanlon maintains that we can explain this signiﬁcance by appealing to
conceptual truths. In response to questions about why our normative judg-
ments ﬁgure so prominently in our practical lives, he replies: if they did not
so ﬁgure, then we would not be rational agents, for it is part of the very
idea of rational agency that such agents are moved by their normative judg-
ments. But as in the water example above, this is an explanation of the
wrong sort. Observing that something satisﬁes our concept of a rational
agent only if it regularly acts in accordance with its normative judgments
no more explains why we regularly act in accordance with our normative
judgments than observing that something satisﬁes the concept of water
only if it is clear explains why the stuff in Lake Michigan is clear. The con-
ceptual truth that normative judgments are practically signiﬁcant may ex-
plain why our concept of a normative judgment does not apply to judg-
ments that lack practical signiﬁcance. It does not, however, explain why
our normative judgments are practically signiﬁcant. Any explanation in-
voking this conceptual truth would have to proceed in the other direction:
judgments count as normative at least partly because they regularly ﬁgure
in our practical deliberations.50
Scanlon’s explanation may appear stronger than this, since it might
seem that we have independent reasons to think of ourselves as rational
agents. If those reasons explain our rationality, then they can also explain
the practical signiﬁcance of our normative judgments. This appearance is
misleading, though. It depends on a crucial ambiguity in the term “ratio-
nal agent.” According to one sense of this term, to say that we are rational
agents is merely to say that we are capable of acting for reasons. And there
are indeed all sorts of considerations that support the conclusion that we
are rational in this sense. According to another sense of the term, though,
to say that we are rational agents is to say that we (more or less) conform to
the norms of rationality. Creatures that fail to be rational in this sense are
not nonrational; they are irrational. Scanlon’s “idea of rational agency” is
50. I am indebted to Mark Schroeder for helping me formulate the ideas in this and
the previous paragraph. For a similar argument about the explanatory limits of this sort of
conceptual connection, see Jon Tresan, “De Dicto Internalist Cognitivism,”Noûs 40 (2006):
145–48.
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clearly a conception of rationality in this second sense.51 The question, then,
is whether we have any independent reason to think of ourselves as rational
in this way. But this is no different from the question of whether we can
explain or account for the practical signiﬁcance of our normative judg-
ments. Scanlon certainly cannot explain our status as rational agents by
appealing to the fact that we tend to act in accordance with our normative
judgments. That would make his proposed explanation of the practical
signiﬁcance of our normative judgments blatantly circular: our normative
judgments have practical consequences because we are rational agents,
and we count as rational agents because our normative judgments have
practical consequences. We need some independent reason to think we are
rational in this sense. After all, what we are hoping to explain is not why
rational agents usually act in accordance with their normative judgments,
but rather why we usually act in accordance with our normative judgments.
A conception of rationality will contribute to such an explanation only if we
have independent reasons to think we are rational in the relevant sense.52
Where does that leave us? The connection between thinking about
what we ought to do and thinking about what to do must be more inti-
mate than the merely contingent one posited by externalists like Ross
and Parﬁt. Shafer-Landau and Scanlon tighten this connection but in a
way that leaves it mysterious. What we need, then, is an account of the re-
lation between ethical thought and practical thought that preserves the
tight connection while also illuminating it.
IV
One of the obstacles preventing externalists like Parﬁt, Shafer-Landau,
and Scanlon from offering more enlightening explanations of the prac-
51. Scanlon writes: “A being is a rational agent only if the judgments that itmakes about
reasons make a difference to the actions and attitudes that it proceeds to have. . . . A rational
agent will, for example, generally intend to do those actions that he or she judges himorher-
self to have conclusive reason to do” (Being Realistic about Reasons, 54).
52. It might seem that the Davidsonian considerations mentioned in Section II could
provide the relevant explanation. On the assumption that rationality requires agents to act
in accordance with their normative judgments, Davidson’s principle of charity does guar-
antee that most of our actions will accord with our ethical commitments. If they did not, we
would not be able to interpret or make sense of ourselves. But this “hermeneutic” expla-
nation leaves the psychological phenomenon that interests us mysterious. It tells us that
we cannot help but apply certain labels to us and our commitments, but it does not shed
light on why we act the way we do. Put another way, it does not tell us why normative judg-
ments alone have this distinctive constitutive connection to rationality. (Compare James
Dreier, “Another World,” in Passions and Projections, ed. Robert N. Johnson and Michael
Smith [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015], 161–66.) A Davidsonian might insist that
this is the only kind of explanation available of our tendency to act in accordance with our
normative judgments. We could refute that claim, however, by providing a more substan-
tive and illuminating explanation, which I attempt to do in Section IV below.
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ticality of normative judgments is that they are also nonnaturalists: they
all take normative concepts and properties to be irreducibly normative.
Consequently, they cannot explain the practical signiﬁcance of norma-
tive judgments by citing their content. They obviously cannot analyze
that content in nonnormative or descriptive terms, for then they would
no longer be nonnaturalists. They could, of course, analyze the content
of one sort of normative judgment in terms of another—by saying, for
instance, that judgments about reasons are just judgments about what
counts in favor of what—but that would leave us with the puzzle of why
judgments about the irreducibly normative counting-in-favor-of relation
have practical consequences. Any such nonreductive analysis wouldmerely
relocate the puzzle rather than solve it.53
Reductive hypotheses have much greater explanatory potential. In
fact, I believe that even a fairly modest reductive hypothesis about the
content of ethical thought can shed a great deal of light on the relation
between ethics and practical reasoning. Here is my hypothesis: norma-
tive reasoning is reasoning about practical reasoning—to think about rea-
sons for action or about what ought to be done is to think about practical
reasoning rather than to engage in it. More speciﬁcally, normative reason-
ing is reasoning about sound or successful practical reasoning. When, for
example, I conclude that I ought to eat lunch at home tomorrow, my con-
clusion concerns the outcome of sound practical reasoning. In particular,
it amounts to the judgment that were I to reason soundly about where
to eat lunch tomorrow, I would arrive at the intention or decision to eat at
home. Similarly, when I judge that the fact that our ﬁnances are currently
stretched is a reason for me to eat at home tomorrow, I judge that this fact
about our ﬁnances ﬁgures in sound reasoning that would conclude with
the intention or decision to eat at home.54
According to this modest hypothesis, the difference between prac-
tical reasoning and normative reasoning is the difference between think-
ing about what to do and thinking about one’s thinking about what to
do. It follows that normative or ethical judgments are about practical rea-
soning rather than products of it, and that normative reasoning is a form
of doxastic or theoretical reasoning. The conclusion of ethical deliber-
ation—a judgment about what I ought to do—is just a belief about the
outcome of sound practical reasoning. I can form such a belief without
53. For a possible exception, see Wedgwood, The Nature of Normativity, chap. 4.
54. This analysis of judgments about reasons needs reﬁnement, of course. For my full
account of how reasons ﬁgure in practical reasoning, see Matthew Silverstein, “Reducing
Reasons,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 10 (2016): 1–22; and compare Kieran Setiya,
“What Is a Reason to Act?” Philosophical Studies 167 (2014): 221–35; and JonathanWay, “Rea-
sons as Premises of Good Reasoning,” Paciﬁc Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming). I have
omitted most of the details here, since my focus in this article is on the broader picture.
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deciding what to do: I can have a view about the outcome of sound prac-
tical reasoning or about considerations that ﬁgure in sound practical rea-
soning without engaging in practical reasoning. This is why I can conclude
that I ought to have lunch at home tomorrow without having decided or
even taken up the question of where to eat—and why more generally I
can think about what I ought to do or about what I have reason to do with-
out thereby deliberating about what to do. I can have a settled view about
what the conclusion of sound or successful practical reasoning would be
without engaging in practical reasoning at all.
This account of the content of ethical thought might appear circu-
lar, since soundness seems like a normative notion: to reason soundly is
to reason well or as one should. If soundness is irreducibly normative,
then my hypothesis will succeed merely in analyzing normative reason-
ing in normative terms—terms that are themselves subject to that very
same analysis (and so on ad inﬁnitum). The hypothesis will amount to
nothing more than the claim that normative judgments are judgments
about how practical reasoning ought to be conducted. And in that case
we would still lack an explanation about how such judgments become
practical for the conduct of that reasoning.
I accept that soundness is a normative notion, but I deny that it is
irreducibly normative. I believe that we can understand the soundness
of practical reasoning much as we understand the soundness of doxastic
reasoning, and that we can understand the latter in purely descriptive
terms. I have argued at length for this conclusion elsewhere, and I shall
not rehearse those arguments here.55 Instead I propose that we treat a
descriptive account of soundness as a central component of my hypoth-
esis about the relation between ethical thought and practical thought. If,
as I shall argue, this hypothesis can explain various otherwise mysterious
phenomena, then we will have additional reasons to take the idea that
soundness is a descriptive notion seriously.
With that in mind, let me introduce an analogy that may help to
clarify my hypothesis. Consider the kind of reasoning or calculation we
employ when we perform long division. Suppose you are taking an exam
and are presented with a complicated long division problem. Suppose fur-
ther that before you even attempt to calculate the correct answer, you al-
ready have a view about what the correct answer is. (Perhaps you saw the
answer key before starting the test, or perhaps a mathematically gifted
friend of yours reported the answer.) We can think of your view about
the correct answer as a belief about the result you would reach if you cal-
culated the quotient soundly. Put another way, we can think of it as a be-
lief about the outcome of sound “divisional reasoning.” Notice, though,
55. See Silverstein, “Reducing Reasons,” secs. 2–3.
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that in having formed such a belief, you have not yet engaged in divi-
sional reasoning; you have not yet performed long division. This distinc-
tion between having a view about the correct answer and performing the
actual calculation mirrors the distinction between having a view about
how you ought to act and engaging in practical reasoning. Just as you can
form a belief about the relevant quotient without actually performing
long division, so can you form a belief about the outcome of sound prac-
tical reasoning without actually engaging in practical reasoning. The con-
verse holds as well. You can perform long division to completion with-
out forming a belief about the relevant quotient. If you have sufﬁcient
doubts about your arithmetic skill, you might work through a long divi-
sion problem multiple times without being at all conﬁdent that the re-
sult of your calculations is the quotient you are looking for. Similarly, you
can engage in practical reasoning and decide what to do without form-
ing an opinion as to whether your decision is the product of sound practi-
cal reasoning.
I shall return to this analogy below. For now the crucial idea is just
that the point of ethical concepts is to enable us to think about practical
reasoning, either our own or someone else’s. But why, you might be won-
dering, do we need special concepts in order to do this? After all, if prac-
tical reasoning has a substantive aim, we should be able to think about
practical reasoning by thinking in terms of that aim. What need is there
for the concept ought? We can shed some light on this question by noting
that we may disagree about the aim of practical reasoning. If you happen
to subscribe to a theory of practical reasoning that differs from mine,
then my describing an action as the one that would achieve the aim iden-
tiﬁed by my theory (whatever that aim is) will fail to convey to you the
thought I hope to convey, namely, that the intention to perform the ac-
tion in question would be the outcome of sound practical reasoning on
your part. This is what the normative concept ought is for. By telling you
that you ought to perform some action, I can recommend that action as
the outcome of sound practical reasoning even if I do not know how you
understand the point of practical reasoning. Similarly, unless I know that
you share my view about the aim of practical reasoning, I cannot recom-
mend a consideration as relevant to your practical reasoning merely by
describing it in terms of that aim. This is what the normative concept of
a reason for action is for. In the presence of widespread disagreement
about the nature of practical reasoning, we need normative concepts like
these to think and talk about practical reasoning.
This account of the purpose of normative concepts suggests that
where there is widespread agreement about the constitutive aim of rea-
soning, normative concepts should be less prominent than they are in
the practical realm. That is precisely what we ﬁnd. Consider the case
of doxastic or theoretical reasoning. It is widely accepted that the goal
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of theoretical reasoning is truth. This may be because, as Nishi Shah has
observed, doxastic deliberation is transparent: deliberation about what
to believe invariably gives way to deliberation about what is true.56 Given
the transparency of theoretical reasoning, I can recommend a consid-
eration as relevant to your deliberation merely by identifying it as evi-
dence—that is, by identifying it as something that bears on the truth
of the proposition about which you are deliberating. Similarly, I can tell
you that you would arrive at some conclusion were you to engage in sound
theoretical reasoning merely by identifying that conclusion as true. This
explains why everyday conversations about what to believe are seldom
cast in terms of what we ought to believe or in terms of our reasons for be-
lief. Instead these conversations are cast in terms of truth and evidence.
If I think you have gone astray in your theoretical deliberation, I will de-
clare that your conclusion is false or that you are ignoring important evi-
dence. Of course I can also declare that you ought to believe otherwise
or that you are ignoring important epistemic reasons. These normative
notions are perfectly sensible when applied in the theoretical domain,
but they are largely otiose. They are most useful in the philosophy class-
room when we theorize about the aim of doxastic deliberation or the na-
ture of knowledge.When we are outside of the classroom thinking or talk-
ing about what to believe, normative concepts play almost no role at all.
It is the relative opacity of practical deliberation, then, that explains
the usefulness of normative concepts in the practical domain. In the ab-
sence of any agreement about the aim of practical reasoning, we need
normative concepts to think and talk about each other’s practical deliber-
ations. Normative concepts also enable us to formulate general claims—
or theories—about sound practical reasoning. Even if I have no view
about the aim of practical reasoning, I may nevertheless believe that
sound practical reasoning could never conclude with the intention to
break a promise. If so, then I believe that one ought never to break one’s
promises. I might also want to make general claims about the kinds of
considerations that regularly (or necessarily) ﬁgure in sound practical
reasoning, which I can frame as normative principles about reasons
for action.
In all of these contexts, normative concepts are helpful because they
enable us to think and talk about the ingredients and outcomes of sound
practical reasoning. As I argued above, though, we can engage in practi-
cal reasoning without making any normative judgments or even asking
any normative questions. Practically speaking, normative thought is dis-
pensable. This raises the question we pressed against various versions
56. See Nishi Shah, “HowTruth Governs Belief,” Philosophical Review 112 (3002):447–82,
447–48.
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of externalism: If normative thought is dispensable, why do ethical con-
siderations nevertheless ﬁgure so frequently in our practical delibera-
tions? Why, when we are reasoning about what to do, do we so often ac-
cord signiﬁcant weight to what we ought to do or what we have most
reason to do?
A complete answer to these questions would presumably require us
ﬁrst to determine the substantive aim of practical reasoning. But even
without an account of the nature of practical thought at our disposal,
my hypothesis about the point of ethical reasoning can provide illumina-
tion here. If ethical reasoning is reasoning about sound practical reason-
ing, then it should not be surprising that our judgments about what
makes for sound practical deliberation play a role in our actual deliber-
ations. Consider again the analogy to long division. We should expect
your belief about the correct answer to inﬂuence your calculations. After
all, your aim in performing those calculations is just to identify that quo-
tient. Your belief about the quotient therefore bears directly on your cal-
culations. If you are sufﬁciently conﬁdent in that belief, it will guide your
calculations in various ways, leading you to add a remainder here or no-
tice a mistake there. It may even prompt you to run through your calcu-
lation again if the answer you reach is not the one you believe to be cor-
rect. The same goes for one’s views about sound practical reasoning. The
point of practical reasoning is to arrive at a conclusion about what to do
that is supported by true premises. If I am sufﬁciently conﬁdent in my
judgment that sound practical deliberation would conclude with the in-
tention to eat lunch at home tomorrow, that judgment will almost cer-
tainly guide my practical deliberations in various ways, leadingme to give
weight to considerations that militate against going out and that count
in favor of staying home. My normative judgment might even prompt
me to rethink my practical deliberations in the event I arrive at the deci-
sion to eat out at my favorite restaurant.57
57. Here externalists like Scanlon and Shafer-Landau might complain that my expla-
nation of the practical signiﬁcance of ethical judgments suffers from precisely the ﬂaw I
found in their explanations. I have suggested that our ethical judgments ﬁgure regularly
in our practical reasoning because they are judgments about sound practical reasoning.
Why do we care about reasoning soundly? Why must our aim in practical reasoning be
to arrive at a sound conclusion? Because, I am inclined to reply, that is just what reasoning
is. A train of thought would not be recognizable as reasoning were it not aimed at issuing in
a sound or correct result. And nowmy explanation appears to have the same form as theirs:
we each appeal to a conceptual truth—they to one about rational agency, I to one about
reasoning—in order to explain a metaphysical or psychological phenomenon.
The parallels end there, though. Recall that my ultimate complaint about Scanlon’s
appeal to the conceptual truth that rational agents act in accordance with their normative
judgments is that he cannot provide us with any independent reason to think that we are
rational in the relevant sense. If the only evidence that we are rational is that we tend to act
in accordance with our normative judgments, then our rationality cannot explain this ten-
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Recall those platitudes about the practical signiﬁcance of ethics
fromHare andGibbard: “The function of [ethical judgments] is to guide
conduct”; “Ethics concerns what to do.”58 Hare and Gibbard maintain
that the only way to do justice to these platitudes is to recognize that eth-
ical thought just is practical thought. It should now be clear, though, that
the hypothesis that normative reasoning is reasoning about sound or suc-
cessful practical reasoning can also account for the practical signiﬁcance
of ethics. Denying that “ought questions and reason questions are by their
very nature questions of what to do” need not leave ethical thought inert
or otiose.59 After all, judgments about the outcome of sound practical de-
liberation (or about the considerations that ﬁgure in sound practical de-
liberation) are obviously and necessarily relevant to practical deliber-
ation. Pace Hare, ethical judgments can guide conduct even if they do
not directly answer the practical question of what to do. Instead they can
guide conduct by being about the answer to that question.
V
Although our normative judgments necessarily bear on our practical de-
liberations, they do not always dictate the outcome of those delibera-
tions. Sometimes we act contrary to our judgments about how we ought
to act. Sometimes, in other words, ethical thought and practical thought
come apart.
Proponents of the identity thesis must deny this, of course. At most
their view allows for cases of compulsion or addiction. In such cases our
intentions are formed in line with our normative judgments but are then
overridden by pathological urges or fears: practical thought remains con-
cordant with ethical thought but is overwhelmed by brute motivational
forces. When we act out of compulsion or addiction, we do not act on
the basis of our practical reasoning, and so our actions are not inten-
tional or autonomous. We do not exercise our agency: our actions are
traceable to psychological states within us, rather than to ourselves.
58. Hare, The Language of Morals, 1; Gibbard, Thinking How to Live, 13.
59. Gibbard, Thinking How to Live, 9, 17.
dency. Now, it may seem that my explanation is similarly empty: if the only evidence that we
engage in practical reasoning is that we care about soundness, then the fact that we are
reasoners cannot explain our concern for soundness. But this is not the only evidence. Any
kind of deliberation that lacked the aim of soundness would not be able to produce the
kinds of intentional or autonomous actions our deliberations are clearly capable of pro-
ducing. Pick any account of practical reasoning drawn from the philosophy of action. If
we remove the aim of arriving at a sound conclusion from that account, we vitiate its ex-
planatory power. There are, then, plenty of independent reasons to think that our practical
deliberations essentially aim at soundness. Thanks to Jamie Dreier for pressing me on this
point.
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Although the identity thesis leaves room for this sort of weakness of
will, it does not allow for less extreme kinds of weakness or akrasia. More
speciﬁcally, it does not allow for cases where our judgments about what
we ought to do fail to govern our practical deliberations—cases where we
freely and intentionally perform some action even though we judge that
we ought to act otherwise. These are cases of clear-eyed akrasia, and they
are lamentably familiar. As J. L. Austin observed, “we often succumb to
temptation with calm and even with ﬁnesse.”60 Recall my ﬁrm conviction
that I ought to eat lunch at home tomorrow. Sometime tomorrow morn-
ing, I will take up the question of where to have lunch. I will engage in
practical reasoning. My judgment that I ought to eat at home certainly
bears on that reasoning, and I imagine it will ﬁgure explicitly in my
thoughts. I am not at all conﬁdent it will dictate the outcome of my de-
liberation, though. If past experience is anything to go by, there is a de-
cent chance I will decide to go out. And if I act on the basis of that deci-
sion, I will do so freely and intentionally. It is a fatal ﬂaw of the identity
thesis that it cannot accommodate this sort of behavior.
My hypothesis that normative reasoning is reasoning about sound
practical reasoning leaves plenty of room for the possibility of akrasia.
It can also explain why akrasia is psychologically distinctive and thus phil-
osophically interesting. According to my hypothesis, there is no guaran-
tee that our practical deliberations will track our normative convictions.
My judgments about the considerations that bear on my practical delib-
eration may not line up with the considerations that actually ﬁgure in
that deliberation. Put another way, the considerations I believe would
be premises in sound or successful practical reasoning may not be the
considerations on which I rely in my actual practical reasoning: the con-
siderations I judge to be reasons may not be the considerations I respond
to as reasons in my practical deliberation. So, I may act intentionally (in-
deed for reasons) yet contrary to my judgment about how I ought to act.
When I do, though, I recognize that something rather odd has hap-
pened. My behavior is accompanied by cognitive dissonance: it feels like
a kind of malfunction. After all, I am always trying to reason soundly, yet
in cases of clear-eyed akrasia I arrive at a conclusion I judge to be the prod-
uct of unsound reasoning. My judgment about the outcome of sound rea-
soning conﬂicts with the outcome of my attempt at sound reasoning. Some-
thing has clearly gone awry.
Return to the analogy with long division. My attempt to calculate
the quotient may produce an answer that differs from the one I believe
(for whatever reason) to be correct. I may then run through the calcula-
60. J. L. Austin, “A Plea for Excuses,” in Philosophical Papers, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1979), 175–204, 198.
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tion again, but there is no guarantee I will arrive at a different result. And
if I don’t, I am bound to experience some sort of discomfort or disso-
nance. My attitudes do not strictly contradict one another: on the one
hand I have a belief about the outcome of sound long division and on
the other hand I have the product of my attempt to perform sound long
division. My belief nevertheless leads me to expect that my calculation
will produce a certain result. When it does not, I am likely to feel con-
founded.
There is no guarantee that my calculation (rather than my belief
about the correct answer) is the source of the problem, however.Mymath-
ematically gifted friend may have made a rare mistake, or I may have mis-
read the answer key. Similarly, when the outcome of practical reasoning
does not comport with one’s normative convictions, there is no guarantee
that one’s practical reasoning (rather than one’s normative reasoning) is to
blame. Sometimes, of course, we do act contrary to what we know is best.
Other times, though, it is our normative judgment—our normative theory,
as it were—that is mistaken.
Consider the case of John, who has grown up in a fundamentalist
family and has internalized various problematic normative beliefs about
gays and lesbians. Like his parents, John ﬁrmly believes that homosexu-
ality is immoral and that gay people should be shunned. Put in terms of
reasons, John believes that the fact that someone is gay is a decisive rea-
son to shun that person. When John arrives at university, however, he
comes into contact with people whose sexual orientation differs from
his own for the ﬁrst time. At ﬁrst he shuns these people, as his values
countenance. Over time, though, he begins to treat his gay and lesbian
classmates with respect. In his practical deliberations—his deliberations
about what to do—he no longer treats the fact that someone is gay as rel-
evant or signiﬁcant: he no longer accords weight to such considerations
in his practical reasoning. Yet he continues to believe—and even to pro-
fess—that homosexuality is a sin and that gays and lesbians are to be
shunned. Although his practical orientation has shifted, his normative
outlook has lagged behind. Consequently, when he ﬁnds himself treat-
ing his gay and lesbian classmates respectfully, he experiences cognitive
dissonance.
My hypothesis about the relation between normative thought and
practical thought can help us understand why. According to that hypoth-
esis, John’s judgment that he ought to shun gay and lesbian students con-
cerns the outcome of sound practical reasoning. It is tantamount to the
judgment that were he reasoning soundly, he would arrive at the inten-
tion to shun his classmates. But he does not arrive at that intention. By
his own lights, then, John is reasoning unsoundly. Every time he consid-
ers the question of how to treat his gay and lesbian classmates, he arrives
at the intention to treat them respectfully. But he also believes that sound
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or successful practical reasoning would conclude with the intention to
shun these classmates. The conclusions John is reaching through prac-
tical reasoning are not the conclusions he believes to be sound—hence
his psychological discomfort.
VI
Any compelling account of the relation between ethical thought and
practical thought must steer between two extremes. On the one hand
it must avoid the extreme internalism of the identity thesis, according
to which ethical thought just is practical thought. Although the identity
thesis captures the practical signiﬁcance of normative thought, it ignores
the fact that ethical thought and practical thought frequently diverge.
On the other hand a successful account of the relation between ethics and
practical reasoning must avoid the extreme externalism of nonnatural-
ists like Parﬁt and Scanlon. Externalism of this sort allows for the possibil-
ityof clear-eyedakrasia but leaves the practical relevance of normative judg-
ments mysterious.
In this article I have attempted to chart a middle path. I have argued
that we can illuminate the relation between ethics and practical reason-
ing by focusing on the content of ethical thought. My hypothesis is that
ethical thought is about practical thought.More speciﬁcally, ethical or nor-
mative reasoning is reasoning about sound or successful practical reason-
ing. Although ethical reasoning is not itself practical reasoning, then,
there remains a close and necessary connection between them: the lat-
ter is the subject matter of the former. I have defended this hypothesis
by pointing out what it can explain, including the practical relevance of
ethical deliberation and both the possibility and philosophical interest
of clear-eyed akrasia.
Let me conclude by noting one further implication of my account of
the relation between ethics and practical reason. Recall that my hypoth-
esis presupposes that we can get some sort of independent purchase on
the nature of practical thought. It presupposes, in other words, that prac-
tical reasoning is carried out under the guise of something other than the
good or, more broadly, the normative. Notice, however, that if practical
reasoning does indeed aim at something other than the good, and if eth-
ical reasoning really is reasoning about practical reasoning, then there is
an important sense in which practical thought is conceptually prior to eth-
ical thought. We cannot understand what our normative judgments are
really about without ﬁrst understanding the aim of practical deliberation.
Put another way, if we do not understand the aim of practical reasoning,
then we cannot get any sort of grip on the real subject matter of ethics—
beyond, of course, knowing that its subject matter is sound practical rea-
soning.
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If my hypothesis is correct, then, it turns out that insofar as the phi-
losophy of action has anything to tell us about the aim of practical reason-
ing, the philosophy of action is indispensable for ethical inquiry. For accord-
ing to that hypothesis, the subject matter of ethics is practical reasoning,
something that is inextricably intertwined with various other phenomena
studied by philosophers of action, including intention, agency, autonomy,
and action for a reason. And if that is what ethics is about, then we cannot
hope to develop a suitable ethical theory without ﬁrst studying agency and
the nature of practical thought. We cannot be good ethical theorists with-
out also being good action theorists.
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